3,058 research outputs found

    Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

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    The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here, we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) in terms of conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways given previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions that the strategies are adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory, which could be either cooperation or defection. A transition between cooperative and defective attractors occurs as a function of different parameters such a mutation rate, replacement rate, and memory, all of which affect a player's ability to predict an opponent's behavior.Comment: 27 pages, including supplementary information. 5 figures, 4 suppl. figures. Version accepted for publication in PLoS Comp. Bio

    Generosity Pays in the Presence of Direct Reciprocity: A Comprehensive Study of 2×2 Repeated Games

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    By applying a technique previously developed to study ecosystem assembly [Capitán et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 168101 (2009)] we study the evolutionary stable strategies of iterated 22 games. We focus on memory-one strategies, whose probability to play a given action depends on the actions of both players in the previous time step. We find the asymptotically stable populations resulting from all possible invasions of any known stable population. The results of this invasion process are interpreted as transitions between different populations that occur with a certain probability. Thus the whole process can be described as a Markov chain whose states are the different stable populations. With this approach we are able to study the whole space of symmetric 22 games, characterizing the most probable results of evolution for the different classes of games. Our analysis includes quasi-stationary mixed equilibria that are relevant as very long-lived metastable states and is compared to the predictions of a fixation probability analysis. We confirm earlier results on the success of the Pavlov strategy in a wide range of parameters for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, but find that as the temptation to defect grows there are many other possible successful strategies. Other regions of the diagram reflect the equilibria structure of the underlying one-shot game, albeit often some non-expected strategies arise as well. We thus provide a thorough analysis of iterated 22 games from which we are able to extract some general conclusions. Our most relevant finding is that a great deal of the payoff parameter range can still be understood by focusing on win-stay, lose-shift strategies, and that very ambitious ones, aspiring to obtaining always a high payoff, are never evolutionary stable

    A Computational Approach for Designing Tiger Corridors in India

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    Wildlife corridors are components of landscapes, which facilitate the movement of organisms and processes between intact habitat areas, and thus provide connectivity between the habitats within the landscapes. Corridors are thus regions within a given landscape that connect fragmented habitat patches within the landscape. The major concern of designing corridors as a conservation strategy is primarily to counter, and to the extent possible, mitigate the effects of habitat fragmentation and loss on the biodiversity of the landscape, as well as support continuance of land use for essential local and global economic activities in the region of reference. In this paper, we use game theory, graph theory, membership functions and chain code algorithm to model and design a set of wildlife corridors with tiger (Panthera tigris tigris) as the focal species. We identify the parameters which would affect the tiger population in a landscape complex and using the presence of these identified parameters construct a graph using the habitat patches supporting tiger presence in the landscape complex as vertices and the possible paths between them as edges. The passage of tigers through the possible paths have been modelled as an Assurance game, with tigers as an individual player. The game is played recursively as the tiger passes through each grid considered for the model. The iteration causes the tiger to choose the most suitable path signifying the emergence of adaptability. As a formal explanation of the game, we model this interaction of tiger with the parameters as deterministic finite automata, whose transition function is obtained by the game payoff.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures, 6 tables, NGCT conference 201

    Transition from reciprocal cooperation to persistent behaviour in social dilemmas at the end of adolescence.

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    While human societies are extraordinarily cooperative in comparison with other social species, the question of why we cooperate with unrelated individuals remains open. Here we report results of a lab-in-the-field experiment with people of different ages in a social dilemma. We find that the average amount of cooperativeness is independent of age except for the elderly, who cooperate more, and a behavioural transition from reciprocal, but more volatile behaviour to more persistent actions towards the end of adolescence. Although all ages react to the cooperation received in the previous round, young teenagers mostly respond to what they see in their neighbourhood regardless of their previous actions. Decisions then become more predictable through midlife, when the act of cooperating or not is more likely to be repeated. Our results show that mechanisms such as reciprocity, which is based on reacting to previous actions, may promote cooperation in general, but its influence can be hindered by the fluctuating behaviour in the case of children

    Coherent motion of stereocilia assures the concerted gating of hair-cell transduction channels

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    The hair cell's mechanoreceptive organelle, the hair bundle, is highly sensitive because its transduction channels open over a very narrow range of displacements. The synchronous gating of transduction channels also underlies the active hair-bundle motility that amplifies and tunes responsiveness. The extent to which the gating of independent transduction channels is coordinated depends on how tightly individual stereocilia are constrained to move as a unit. Using dual-beam interferometry in the bullfrog's sacculus, we found that thermal movements of stereocilia located as far apart as a bundle's opposite edges display high coherence and negligible phase lag. Because the mechanical degrees of freedom of stereocilia are strongly constrained, a force applied anywhere in the hair bundle deflects the structure as a unit. This feature assures the concerted gating of transduction channels that maximizes the sensitivity of mechanoelectrical transduction and enhances the hair bundle's capacity to amplify its inputs.Comment: 24 pages, including 6 figures, published in 200

    Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

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    In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction.A. A. gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (under grants no. 200020-143224, CR13I1-138032 and P2LAP1-161864) and by the Rectors’ Conference of the Swiss Universities (under grant no. 26058983). All authors acknowledge financial support to carry out the experiments by the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne and the fundamental support by Prof. Rafael Lalive. This work has been supported in part by the European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 (IBSEN) and by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under grant FIS2015-64349-P (VARIANCE)
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